GITHUB . COM {}

Detected CMS Systems:

Wordpress (2 occurrences)

Analyzed Page
Matching Content Categories
CMS
Monthly Traffic Estimate
How Does Github.com Make Money
How Much Does Github.com Make
Wordpress Themes And Plugins
Keywords
Topics
Payment Methods
Questions
Schema
External Links
Analytics And Tracking
Libraries
Hosting Providers

We are analyzing https://github.com/w3c/hr-time/issues/79.

Title:
Security and privacy considerations for DOMHighResTimeStamp resolution · Issue #79 · w3c/hr-time
Description:
Note: the intent of this issue is to provide a reference and track the ongoing research, discussions, proposals, and implementation techniques employed by various browsers on how they expose or provide access to high resolution time. Par...
Website Age:
17 years and 8 months (reg. 2007-10-09).

Matching Content Categories {📚}

Telecommunications
Technology & Computing
Mobile Technology & AI

Content Management System {📝}

What CMS is github.com built with?

Github.com is powered by WORDPRESS.

Traffic Estimate {📈}

What is the average monthly size of github.com audience?

🚀🌠 Tremendous Traffic: 10M - 20M visitors per month

Based on our best estimate, this website will receive around 10,000,019 visitors per month in the current month.
However, some sources were not loaded, we suggest to reload the page to get complete results.

check SE Ranking
check Ahrefs
check Similarweb
check Ubersuggest
check Semrush

How Does Github.com Make Money? {💸}

Subscription Packages {💳}

We've located a dedicated page on github.com that might include details about subscription plans or recurring payments. We identified it based on the word pricing in one of its internal links. Below, you'll find additional estimates for its monthly recurring revenues.

How Much Does Github.com Make? {💰}

Subscription Packages {💳}

Prices on github.com are in US Dollars ($). They range from $4.00/month to $21.00/month.
We estimate that the site has approximately 4,989,889 paying customers.
The estimated monthly recurring revenue (MRR) is $20,957,532.
The estimated annual recurring revenues (ARR) are $251,490,385.

Wordpress Themes and Plugins {🎨}

What WordPress theme does this site use?

It is strange but we were not able to detect any theme on the page.

What WordPress plugins does this website use?

It is strange but we were not able to detect any plugins on the page.

Keywords {🔍}

resolution, security, privacy, attack, attacks, timing, timers, standard, issue, existing, point, commented, hrt, mitigations, domhighrestimestamp, access, user, group, history, visited, svg, igrigorik, time, yoavweiss, floating, sources, links, precision, comment, mentioned, pesk, concerns, subnormal, cache, usenix, performancenow, filters, state, paint, code, discussions, browsers, submillisecond, attacker, spectre, response, dont, share, functionality, feature,

Topics {✒️}

security-tracker group bringing privacy-tracker group bringing /docs/web/api/domhighrestimestamp cache-sharing design choice w3c generally expects enables 2ns-resolution timing floating-point timing channels single open issue attacker-controlled arbitrary numbers millisecond high-precision timers svg fill-color similar high resolution time js code-cache js code cache v8 code cache code paths messed existing permission prompts enables 2ns resolution cross-origin resource double-key visited links personal information security fixed point math millisecond time resolution hr-time high-resolution timestamps high-precision timers high precision timers subnormal floating point floating point operations css 3d transforms breaking existing sites svg fill color disable paint worklets 12th {usenix} workshop leaves users vulnerable keystroke/mouse events ambient light sensors existing industry consensus clock resolution igrigorik mentioned expensive paint operations accurate timing information existing hrt sources resulting color change process isolation recommended minimum resolution microarchitecture timing attacks making hrt globally violates basic privacy projects milestone

Payment Methods {📊}

Braintree

Questions {❓}

@snyderp - Do you know how native OSes deal with that type of attacks?
@yoavweiss Am I correct in understanding that this is the single open issue which represents the items raised by PING during review?
Already have an account?
Could you share examples where these 3 conditions are met?
I don't really understand the Firefox claim above by the way, is there a test that demonstrates the issue?
Now() enables 2ns resolution?

Schema {🗺️}

DiscussionForumPosting:
      context:https://schema.org
      headline:Security and privacy considerations for DOMHighResTimeStamp resolution
      articleBody:_Note: the intent of this issue is to provide a reference and track the ongoing research, discussions, proposals, and implementation techniques employed by various browsers on how they expose or provide access to high resolution time._ --- Paraphrasing [Section 7.1: Clock resolution](https://w3c.github.io/hr-time/#clock-resolution)... > Access to accurate timing information, both for measurement and scheduling purposes, is a common requirement for many applications... This specification defines an API that provides sub-millisecond time resolution, which is more accurate than the previously available millisecond resolution exposed by DOMTimeStamp. > > ... Access to the same accurate timing information can sometimes be also used for malicious purposes by an attacker to guess and infer data that they can't see or access otherwise. > > To ensure that the new API does not significantly improve the accuracy or speed of such attacks, the recommended minimum resolution of the DOMHighResTimeStamp type should be inaccurate enough to prevent attacks... In order to mitigate such attacks user agents may deploy any technique they deem necessary. These techniques may include: Resolution reduction, added jitter, abuse detection and/or API call throttling. This problem space space remains an unsolved and an evolving one. There is no existing industry consensus or a definitive set of recommendations that applies to all browsers, which is reflected in the range of different implementations and platform-specific techniques used by various browsers. --- Relevant prior art and discussions: 1. Reducing resolution (SPECTRE and microarchitecture timing attacks): https://github.com/w3c/hr-time/issues/56 1. PING review feedback: https://github.com/w3c/hr-time/issues/20 * Gating timestamps behind existing permission prompts: https://github.com/w3c/hr-time/issues/64 * Related discussion on evaluated and proposed strategies: https://github.com/w3c/hr-time/issues/56#issuecomment-485583476
      author:
         url:https://github.com/igrigorik
         type:Person
         name:igrigorik
      datePublished:2019-07-02T15:53:49.000Z
      interactionStatistic:
         type:InteractionCounter
         interactionType:https://schema.org/CommentAction
         userInteractionCount:14
      url:https://github.com/79/hr-time/issues/79
      context:https://schema.org
      headline:Security and privacy considerations for DOMHighResTimeStamp resolution
      articleBody:_Note: the intent of this issue is to provide a reference and track the ongoing research, discussions, proposals, and implementation techniques employed by various browsers on how they expose or provide access to high resolution time._ --- Paraphrasing [Section 7.1: Clock resolution](https://w3c.github.io/hr-time/#clock-resolution)... > Access to accurate timing information, both for measurement and scheduling purposes, is a common requirement for many applications... This specification defines an API that provides sub-millisecond time resolution, which is more accurate than the previously available millisecond resolution exposed by DOMTimeStamp. > > ... Access to the same accurate timing information can sometimes be also used for malicious purposes by an attacker to guess and infer data that they can't see or access otherwise. > > To ensure that the new API does not significantly improve the accuracy or speed of such attacks, the recommended minimum resolution of the DOMHighResTimeStamp type should be inaccurate enough to prevent attacks... In order to mitigate such attacks user agents may deploy any technique they deem necessary. These techniques may include: Resolution reduction, added jitter, abuse detection and/or API call throttling. This problem space space remains an unsolved and an evolving one. There is no existing industry consensus or a definitive set of recommendations that applies to all browsers, which is reflected in the range of different implementations and platform-specific techniques used by various browsers. --- Relevant prior art and discussions: 1. Reducing resolution (SPECTRE and microarchitecture timing attacks): https://github.com/w3c/hr-time/issues/56 1. PING review feedback: https://github.com/w3c/hr-time/issues/20 * Gating timestamps behind existing permission prompts: https://github.com/w3c/hr-time/issues/64 * Related discussion on evaluated and proposed strategies: https://github.com/w3c/hr-time/issues/56#issuecomment-485583476
      author:
         url:https://github.com/igrigorik
         type:Person
         name:igrigorik
      datePublished:2019-07-02T15:53:49.000Z
      interactionStatistic:
         type:InteractionCounter
         interactionType:https://schema.org/CommentAction
         userInteractionCount:14
      url:https://github.com/79/hr-time/issues/79
Person:
      url:https://github.com/igrigorik
      name:igrigorik
      url:https://github.com/igrigorik
      name:igrigorik
InteractionCounter:
      interactionType:https://schema.org/CommentAction
      userInteractionCount:14
      interactionType:https://schema.org/CommentAction
      userInteractionCount:14

External Links {🔗}(11)

Analytics and Tracking {📊}

Site Verification - Google

Libraries {📚}

Clipboard.js
D3.js
Lodash

Emails and Hosting {✉️}

Mail Servers:

aspmx.l.google.com
alt1.aspmx.l.google.com
alt2.aspmx.l.google.com
alt3.aspmx.l.google.com
alt4.aspmx.l.google.com

Name Servers:

dns1.p08.nsone.net
dns2.p08.nsone.net
dns3.p08.nsone.net
dns4.p08.nsone.net
ns-1283.awsdns-32.org
ns-1707.awsdns-21.co.uk
ns-421.awsdns-52.com
ns-520.awsdns-01.net

9.09s.